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Abstra ct
This paper explor es the implic ations of Social Secur ity program
s and
annuit y market s throug h which agents , who are charac terized by
differ ent
distri bution s of length of lifetim e, share death relate d risk.
In the
absenc e of annuit y marke ts,
Social Securi ty program can accommodate some
risk sharin g needs within each genera tion. However, under these
circum 
stance s, it also affect s income distrib utions over time, the struct
ure of
observ able intere st rates and saving levels , by changi ng the distrib
ution

a

of beques ts in the economy.

On

the other hand, when annuit y market s do

operat e, a non-di scrimi natory Social Securi ty program will affect
only the
intrag enerat ional alloca tion of resour ces.
In the absenc e of privat e
inform ation regard ing indivi dual surviv al proba blities , such
a program
will

lead

eo a non-op timal

intrag enerat ional

alloca tion

of resour ces.

However, the presen ce of advers e select ion consid eratio ns gives
rise to a
Pareto improving role for a manda tory non-di scrimi natory Social
Securi ty
progra m.

1.

Introduct ion
The existance of uncertain ty with respect to the length of lifetime

will lead individua ls, in' the absence of bequest motive in preferenc es,
to save for their old age via annuities .

This form of savings, which

shares the risks related to old age, makes possible higher rates of return
on foregone consumpti on by making claims to future payments condition al on
individua l specific events such as continued life.
modes of savings,
continge ncies,

In contrast, regular

where returns are not condition ed on such individua l

pay

lower rates of return and generate involunta ry

transfers of purchasin g power across ii;eneratio ns in the form of bequests.
These consider ations, along with the fact that the existing Social
Security program has an important annuity like element in the form of
reduced survivors ' benefits, strongly suggest that both the normative and
positive implicatio ns of such programs depend very much on the alterntiv e
modes of savings that are available to agents.
Here

we

show

that

when

a

Social

Security

life-conti ngent form of savings ~v~i,~h1P

~n ~gPn~~

program

is

only

in the economy, it can

accomodat e some risk-shar ing needs within each generatio n.
these circumsta nces,

the

However, under

it also affects income distributi ons over time by

changing the distribtu tion of bequests in the economy.
On

the

other

hand,

when

annuity

markets

environm ent where there exists diversity
probabili ties,

with

do

operate

respect

of

to

in

an

survival

a non-discr iminatory Social Security program will affect

only the intragen erationa l allocatio n of resource s.
presence

but

adverse

selection

problems created

by

Moreover ,

private

the

informatio n

regarding these survival probabili ties, gives rise to a Pareto improving
role for a manadator y non-discr iminatory Social Security program.

"

2

The role of annuities as a device for sharing uncertain ty about the
length of one's life and observati ons on the absence of complete markets
for

such

contracts

constitut e

an

important

part

of

Diamond's

suggestio ns for evaluatin g Social Security type prograns.

(1977)

The same view

underlies the recent work of Kotlikoff and Spivak ( 1981) who consider the
family institutio n as a substitut e, albeit imperfect , for complete annuity
markets.

Likewise, Sheshinsk i and Weiss ( 1981) examine alternativ e forms

of financing a publicly provided, actuarial ly fair annuity program.

A

different kind of risk that may be inefficie ntly allocated in a decen
tralized

equilibriu m is

considere d by Merton

(1981),

who examines the

features of a Pareto improving social security program in an intertemp oral
model with nontradea ble, randomly productiv e human captial.
A limitation of the above analyses is the absence of an explicit
specifica tion of what features in the environme nt prevents decentral ized
equilibri a from attaining optimal allocatio ns.

Thus Kotlikoff and Spivak

confine their analysis to the relative efficiency of equilibri a when risk
sharing opportuni ties are restricted on a "family" basis, while Merton's
Pareto improving policy depends on some unspecifie d reasons that restricts
the tradabili ty of human capital in the first place.

On the other hand,

Sheshins ki and 'Weiss acknowle dge at the outset that their analysis
pertains to the Social Security program only to the extent that privately
issued

annuities

are

ruled

out.

Here,

we show that

the welfare

implicati ons of Social Security- type programs depend crucially on whether
one explicitl y models the features of the environme nt which inhibit the
efficient operation of annuity markets as opposed to imposing exogenous
market exclusion restrictio ns on certain forms of risk sharing.

Just as

important ly, the impact of such programs on the compositi on of aggregate
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savings, the structure of observable rates of return and the distribution
of income are shown to depend
erations.

on precisely · the same sorts of consid

While we concentrate in this work on the uncertainty which is

related to length of life, we envision extensions and refinements of our
stylized analysis tha~ reflects a variety of individual uncertainties.
Our

analysis

is

conducted

with

a

version

of

Samuelson's

(1958)

overlapping generations model which provides a conveneient framework for
studying the intergeneration al allocation of resources in an intertemporal
economy populated by finitely lived agents.

In the specific model under

consideration, agents live at most two periods. In order to introduce a
natural role for annuities,

we assume that while life during the first

period is certain, death can occur at the beginning of the second period
with

a

positive

probability.

In

probabilities differ across cohorts.

addition,

we

assume

that

survival

These features allow us to examine

the role of an annuity-like Social Security program under a variety of
assumptions concerning the risk sharing contracts available in the economy.
When individuals survival probabilities are commonly known,

Pareto

optimal allocations are characterized by equal consumption levels across
both periods of life of agents that reach old age.

Consequently, ex-ante

marginal rates of substitution of consumption across periods are not equal
at those optimal allocations for agents with different survivial rates.
Rather,

with no population growth,

marginal

rates

of substitution

associated with optimal allocations must equal group specific actuarially
fair

rates.

A competitive

equilibrium,

under

this

public

information

assumption, will support a discriminatory annuity structure with precisely
this return structure, in which each group of cohorts with common survival
proability shares the death related risks among its own members.

In such

4

an equilibriu m, there are no intergene rational transfers of goods in the
form of bequests.

However, this will not be the case under alternativ e

market structure s in which annuities are excluded.

Under such a market

•

exclusion restrictio n, agents save by purchasin g unconditi onal claims to
future payments of a paper asset.

Untimely death occurance s result in a

stationar y equilibriu m with a non-degen erate real

bequest

distributi on

which introduce s hetrogene ity in agents' initial wealth levels. 1

It is

precisely this endogenou s randomne ss that annity markets or social
security type programs eliminate .

The explicit derivatio n of the "bequest

regime" equilibriu m enables us to emphasize the general role of annuities
as optimal risk sharing mechanisms as well as to examine the welfare
implicatio ns of their exclusion s.
The opti.mal sharing of old age risks obtained by private markets is
destroyed by consider ing individu al survival proabilt ies as private
informati on.
(1976)

As was shown by Wilson ( 1977) and Rothschild and Stiglitz

in their work on insurance equilibir a with private informati on,

decentra lized equilibr ia may yield inefficie nt allocatio ns.

In our

context the same problem arises because agents with high survival
probabili ties -- a group which constitut es high risk for annuity issuers
-- impose an externatl ity which harms other agents without necessari ly
gaining anything themselv es.

One way to

improve

the

equi 11 br i um

allocatio n which is consisten t with this informatio n structure involves a
governme nt-impose d nondiscri minatory annuity program which takes the
following form:

agents are forced to contribut e a prespecif ied amount to

the program when young, and are paid off at a rate of return which equals
the economy-wide actuarial ly fair rate of return if they reach old age.
Residual demands for annuities will be supplied in a competiti ve separ-
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ating equilibriu m,

so that,

ex post, agents from different groups will

have purchased some annuities with group specific actuarial ly fair rates
of return.
class

The resulting allocation is Pareto optimal and for a large

of economies ,

Pareto dominates

the

non-interv ention

equilibriu m.

Hence, unlike the analysis ·or Sheshinsk i and Weiss, Social Security and
private annuities are not perfect substitute s from the point of view of
individua l agents in environme nts where there is a clear welfare enhancing
role for social insurance .

Consequen tly, aggregate savings will depend,

in a systemati c way, upon the magnitude of required contribut ions to the
Social Security program.

It is shown that the impositio n of a Pareto

improving social security system can, in some cases, increase the level of
aggregat e savings.
literatur e,

our

Finally,

analysis

not

in

contrast

to most

only distinguis hes

of the

private from

existing
publicly

supplied annuities but also derives optimal combinati ons of these modes of
saving.

2.

Comolete Annuity Markets
In this section, we describe the basic version of the model to be

used

for

examining the

implicatio ns of uncertain lifetimes on optimal

resource allocation s and market structure s.

The main implicatio n of this

section regarding the nature of optimal allocation s is that, unlike other
forms of diversity in individua l character istics such as preferenc es or
endowmen ts, diversity in publicly known survival probabili ties affects in
a fundament al way the nature of the price system which can support such
allocatio ns as decentra lized equilibr ia.

Specific ally, allocatio ns

associate d with stationar y competiti ve equilibri a will be optimal only if
cohorts with different survival probabili ties each face actuarial ly fair
intertemp oral terms of trade.
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The Hodel
The economy to be studied

is a variant of Samuelson's

pure-exchange overlapping generations model.

At each period t, t

(1958)
~

1, the

po~ulation consists of old members of generation t-1 who all die at the
end of that period, and young members of generation t.

Each generation t

-

is partitioned into two distinct Q:roups, A and B, whose relative size is
fixed for all t, so that for each agent of type A there are y agents of
type B, y

> O.

Members of each group live at most two periods, the first

of which they survive with certainty.

Death can occur at the beginning of

the second period with probability (1-,ri), 0

< ,ri' < 1, i = A,B.

With a

continuum of agents, each of whom correctly perceives his death to occur
with probabily 1-1r i, where i

indicates the agent's group,

a proportion

(1-iri) of group i, i = A,B passes away after living only one period,.and
there is no aggregative uncertainty implied by agents'

random lifetimes.

In this and the following section, the survival probability of any given
agent is assumed to be public information.
There is a single nonstorable and nonproducible comsumption good in
this economy.
good.

Each young agent is endowed at birth with w units of the

Generations are of equal size so that each member of generation t

is viewed as giving birth to one identical agent (member of generation
(t+1))

before

the

uncertainty

about

his

continued

life

is

resolved.

Preferences over lifetime consumption ( c i , c i ) of a representative member
1 2
of group i are given by the expected utility function

(2.1)

7

with u'

> 0, u" < 0, u'(c)

that our

as c

+""

0 and u'(c)

+

specifi cation of U[c i1 ,

preferen ces are separabl e over time.

+

0 as c

embodie s the

+

Notice

....

assumpt ion

that

In this we follow Yaar i ( 1965) and

Barro and Friedman (1977) who utilize this specific ation of preferen ces to
deal with the problem of paramet erizing utility over lifetime consump tion
bundles

when

the

length

of

lifetime

itself

is

uncertai n.

Similar

assumpti ons are made througho ut the literatu re.
Before we discuss

specific market

structur es

and

the

effects

of

various government interven tions, we characte rize the set of feasible and
optimal stationa ry allocati ons of this economy.

Definiti on:
A s t ationary allocati on {c i , c i,i
,

1

2

= A,B} is feasible if it satisfie s

(2.2)

Notice that this definiti on reflects our assumpti on about the absence of
aggrega te unceitai nty regardin g the number of deaths in each group.

Definiti on:
I•
A feasible stationa ry allocati on {c-i , -i
1 c 2 ,i = A,B} is optimal if there
does not exist another feasible stationa ry allocati on {c i ,
1
such that

i = A,B

with strict inequali ty for some i.
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It can be shown that an interio r allocat ion, (cki > 0, k = 1,2,
1

=

A,B), is optima l if for some 6 > 0, i = A,B, it solves the problem
1
A

Maximize 6AU (c A,c A) +
1 2
subjec t to (2.2).

A necessa ry

and suffici ent conditi on for

an interio r allocat ion to be

optima l is that it satisfi es (2.2) and has the propert y that

u'(c B )
1

=--- =1

(2.4)

u' (c~)

Notice that

(2.4)

implies that with strictl y concave

prefere nces,

optima l alloca tions have the proper ty that first and second period
consum ption levels be equal for agents who live for two periods .

Given

heterog eneity with respect to surviva l probab ilities, (2.4) also implies
that optima l allocat ions have the propert y that ex ante margin al rates
of
substit ution are not equaliz ed across members of differe ut

(2.5)

esr-uu.,~ ,

i.e.,

u'(c A)

1

1

'll'A u'(c~)

It follow s that in any compe titive equilib rium indivi dually planne
d
consum ption levels will be the same across both periods of heterog eneous
agents '

lives only if agents of type i

face an

b et ween c i

intertem poral tradeo ff

. d c i which equa l s 1/ ,r .
an
Conseq uently, any market structu re
2
1
in which members of the differe nt ta:roups face the same rate of return
on
1

savings will not result in an optima l equilib rium.

9

The above results should be contrasted with those that would arise
under different sorts of diversity across agents such as heterogenei ty
with respect to the preferances and/or endowments.
that

,r A

and

ir

8

In this light, imagine

represented different time discount parameters in (2. 1)

rather than survival probabilitie s.

Under these circumstanc es,

and

,r A

ir

8

A

would not enter the feasibility condition (2.2) which would then be c +
1
B
A
B
rc 1 + c 2 + rc 2 = w( 1+y). The optimality condition would then equate each
of the terms in (2.5) to unity so that a unitary intertempor al tradeoff
between c 1 and c for both groups would support an optimal allocation.
2
Similarly, heterogenei ty with respect to endowments, does not affect the
way in which consumption levels enter the feasibility constraint.

A more

general discussion of the incorporatio n of agent specific attributes in
economy-wide resource constraints and the resulting implications for the
existence and optimality of competitive equilibria is provided by Prescott
and Townsend , ( 1982) •
The

fact

endowments

that

occur

the

in

the

intergenera tional

follow,

therefore,

consumption
first

good

period

is

of

nonstorable

life

generate

and
some

the

good

desired

can be facilitated by a paper asset.

We

the literature on macroeconom ic application s of the

overlapping generations models and assume that the surviving old agents of
generation zero are endowed with a paper asset (money).

The aggregate

stock of the paper asset remains fixed throu$1;h all time periods t, t

~

1.

The inclusion of some asset in the model that facilitates intertempor al
transaction s allows us to separate efficiency problems that are generated
by uncertain lifetimes from those related to the intergener ational
allocation of resources. 2

In what

follows,

we describe a competitive

stationary equilibrium in which agents have access to competitive annuity
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markets, while firms that are established by each generation supply these
annuities and specialize in storing the paper asset.
We model an annuity bond at period t as a claim to a certain quantity
of•·the consumption good

at period t+1

which

original purchaser . of the annuity is alive.

is

payable only if the

Normalizing the purchasing

price of a period t annuity to one unit of the good at t, the annuity's
rate of return represents the intertemporal terms of trade faced by its
buyer.

Given the postulated hetrogenei ty of the population with respect

to survival

probabilities,

we

can potentially think of two kinds of

annuity equilibria; a pooling equilibrium, in which the same annuity is
purchased by members of both groups, and a separating equilibirum in which
agents with different survival probabilities purchase annuities with
different rates of return.

Following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we

define an equilibrium in this market as a set of contracts such that when
agents maximize expected utility:

(i) no contract in the equilibrium set

makes neg·ative expected profits, and

(ii)

there is no contract outside the

equilibrium set that, if offered, will make a nonnegative profit. Clearly,
the absence of aggregate uncertainty in this economy implies a similar
absence of uncertainty regarding the profits of the annuity-supplyi ng
firms.

Therefore,

in either a pooling or separating equilibrium real

profits must be equal to zero.
Let Ri(t) be the real payoff, at t+1, to an annuity purchased at time
t by a member of group i, i t {A,B}, contingent on him being alive at t+1,
and let Di (t) denote the utility maximizing purcahse of such annuities by
that agent..

The real purchase price of such annuities is normalized to

·unity.
In the pooling equilibria, RA{t)
t+1 are given by:

= R8 {t) = R(t)

and profits at period

11

(2.6)

In a stationary equilibrium DA (t) = DA,
all t.

DB(t) = DB and R(t) = R for

Substituting these identities into (2.6), we obtain

or

( 2. 7)

It is clear that this economy wide rate of return lies between 1/ir A and
Notice,
equilibrium

however,

contract

that

because

the
at

pooling

this

contract

rate,

given

oan
by

never

(2.7),

be

an

positive

profits can be made by restricting the sales of such annuities to only one
of the groups.
one

with

each

Hence, the equilibrium will necessarily be a separating
contract netting

zero

profits,

so that

the

separating

payoffs are given by RA= 1/irA and RB= 1/irB. But these are precisely the
intertempor al rates of return which induce an equilibrium in which (2.4),
the necessary and sufficient condition for optimality is satisfied.
see this,

To

notice that the problem of the representati ve young agent of

group i of generation tis:

Maximize

i

J.
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subject to

i

c 1 - w - Di(t)

.

Given our assumptio ns on u( •), necessary and sufficien t condition s
for the solution of this problem are given by

i

u' ( c,)

(2.8)
1

'll'iU (c~)

These condition s imply (2.4) when Ri (t)

=

1/,ri for i

=

A and i

=

B.

Notice that given the strict concavity of u(•), (2.8) implies that

(2.9)

for all agents who live for two periods.

Finally, since allocation (2. 9)

satisfies the resource constrain t (2.2), the essential features of the
competitv e annuity equilibriu m have been completel y described .
It is worthwhil e noting that the above equilibriu m is essential ly one
in which the old of group i share the estate of the deceased members of
their own group.

In

effect,

competiti ve annuity markets discrimin ate

between groups in an actuarial ly fair way, and thereby induce risk sharing
within each specific group rather than across the entire generatio n.

The

result of this market structure is an optimal transfer of goods both
between and within generatio ns.

Conversel y, any annuity policy which does

not discrimin ate between members of different groups would lead to an
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inefficient form of risk sharing and a nonoptimal equilibrium .
results are not inconsisten t with the existing literature.

These

For example

Barro and Friedman and Sheshinski and Weiss assume that agents face an
economy-wid e actuarially fair rate of return on annuities.

To the extent

that agents are homogeneous with respect to survival probabilitie s, the
implicit market structures that were considered in these works will lead
to optimal allocations .

However, when there exists heterogenei ty among

agents with respect to this attribute, an economy-wide actuarially fair
rate of return does not correspond to the decentralize d equilibrium -nor
would it result in an optimal allocation if it were imposed.

Finally, we

note that in such environment s optimally designed Social Security systems
will have no effect on aggregate savings as long as required contribution s
do not exceed the amount that individuals would save in the absence of
such government intervention s.
that there
here.

Essentially , this follows from the fact

is no welfare enhancing role for a Social Security program

Hence, to achieve a Pareto optimal allocation, a Social Security

program requires individuals to purchase publicly provided annuities which
are perfect subs ti tut es for private modes of saving.
increases in publicly mandated savings are simply offset, in a one to one
way, by decreases in private savings.

Aggregate savings will depend on

the magnitude of a Social Security program only to the extent that the
latter leads to a non-optimal equilibrium .
To clarify the risk sharing role of annuities, we now describe the
competitive equilibrium of this economy when no annuities of any kind are
available.

This will enable us to determine whether an annuity equilibium

dominates in some Pareto sense the equilibrium associated with this more
restricted market structure, as well as to identify potential groups that
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will be adversely affected by a decentralize d development of more complete
annuity markets.

3. •:Equilibria Without Annuities
In this section, we examine the nature of a more restricted range of
markets, which are, in some sense, a natural alternative to the complete
market structure of section 2.

Consider our basic economy with a market

restriction that precludes any asset whose payoff depends on whether its
owner is alive or dead.
any bequest motive,

Under such circumstanc es, even in the absence of
the untimely death of some agents creates an

intergenera tional transfer in the form of bequests,.

We posit a "natural"

assignment rule for such bequests, in which the offspring of a parent that
dies prematurely inherits the

value of his

parents'

savings.

We

characteriz e this bequest equilibrium and then compare it to the annuity
equilibrium of sections 2 in order to examine both the desirability and
implementa bility of complete annuity markets in environment s where there
are no natural barriers to the operation of such markets.

The Bequest Equilibrium
Because the main

issues of

this

section can

be

examined

in

the

context of homogeneous survival probabiliti es, we assume that all agents
are

characterize d by a

second

period ,

i •e • ,

ir

common
A =

1'

probability

B =

ir •

of surviving

through

their

In addition to the common good

endowment w, each person receives at birth a bequest consisting of his
parent's savings payoff in the event that the parent dies prematurely .
Savings in any period t, t
the consumption good.

~

1, takes the form of uncondition al claims to

The claims have a real rate of return R(t), and a

selling price that is normalized to unity.

15

A typical young member of generation t,

born with a bequest con

sisting of claims to b uni ts of the consumption good and a good endowment
w, faces the following problem:

max u(c )
1

vu(c )
2

+

(i) c, + s

s.t.

( ii)

c2

<w+ b

-< sR(t)

(iii) s > 0

wheres denotes his real savings.

The

solution

to

this

problem for any

b >-wand any R(t) > 0 satisfies

(3. 1)

-u'[w+b-s] + R(t)vu'[sR( t)J < 0

with equality ifs> 0.

We can characteriz e this solution by a saving function s(b,R), defined for
b >=Wand R

(i)

> o.

The saving function

s(e ,e)

satisfies

s(b,R) > 0,

(ii) 0

< :~ (b,R) < 1,

where (i), (ii), (iii) follow from our assumptions about u(•), made in
section 2.
Each

generation

establishes

a

competitive

savings

industry

which

acquires the paper asset from the previous generation' s firms, which are
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then liquidated.
period t good.

· Let p(t) be the period t asset price in terms of the
A typical firm of generation t that acquires k uni ts of

the paper asset incurs a real cost of kp(t).

At period t+1, these k asset

un!ts will yield kp(t+1) units of the consumption good units which can be
sold as claims at period t for a revenue of kp(t+1)/R(t ).

or no-arbitrage condition

for period t implies

p(t) R(t) - p(t+1) = 0, t

(3.2)

A zero profit

> 1.

The rate of return on the (uncondition al) claims and the asset price
are determined by equating the real savings of generation t with the real
value of the total paper asset, the supply of which is fixed.
members of generation

t

differ

potentially in their real

Since young
bequests,

a

measure of aggregate real savings involves a specificatio n of how bequests
are distributed each period.

Denote by 1'1t (b) the proportion of young

agents born at period t with a real bequest of b or less.
denoting the fixed

asset supply per young agent,

Then, with M

the equality of real

savings and the real value of the asset supply implies

Finally, the law of motion for the bequest distribution s can be obtained
from

a

simple

argument

that

exploits

the

monotonicit y

function s ( • , R) with respect to the bequest level.

of

the

saving

Let h ( z, R) denote the

real bequest level that induces an agent to save z units of the good when
the real rate of return is R, so that
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s[h(z,R),R] = z, z

> 0,

R

> O.

3

Notice that agents that inherit b or less at t+1 can be divided into two
disjoint

groups.

One

group consists of those whose parents

periods and therefore leave no bequest.

The proportion

belong to this group is, by assumption, 1r.
those whose parents died prematurel y,
interest) of b or less.

live two

of agents who

The other group consists of

leaving a bequest

(including

That, in turn, requires that those parents saved

b/R(t) or less, which means that those parents inherited h[b/R(t),R( t)] or
less.

The proportion of parents that received such bequests and died

prematurely is given by (1-1r)111t[h( b/R(t),

R(t))].

These consideratio ns

imply that

(3.4)

Formally then, we define a fixed asset supply equilibrium as a saving
function s(b,R],
{R ( t) : t

~

1}

asset prices {p(t) :t

and

~

1},

real bequest distribution s

(3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4).

rates of return on savings
{wt ( •) l t

~

1},

satisfying

A stationary equilibrium is defined as an

equilibrium with time invariant bequest distribution s, i.e., 1'1t =
all t

>

ij,*

for

1.

In appendix A, we prove the existence and uniqueness of a stationary
equilibrium which has the following fairly intuitive characteris tics:
In

a stationary equilibrium ,

the

asset

price is

the

same

in

all

periods so that the real return on claims is unity at all times.

The

stationary

bequest distributio n

infinite support,
by:

w• (•)

has

a

bounded

countable

denoted by {bk, k=0,1,2, ••• }, defined recursively
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b
(3.5)

= 0,

0

bk= s(bk_ 1 ,1), k

~

1,

where b• = sup{bk' k = 0,1,2, ••• } satisfies s(b*,1) = b• •
...

Finally,

••< ) is

given by

(3.6)

An intuitive justificatio n for

the above equilibrium is gained by

observing that, because savings are positive, no agent inherits a negative
bequest and a proportion w of agents inherit zero each period.
0 and ,i, * (b )
0

=

etc..

Agents that inherit zero save b = s(b ,1), and ( 1-'R')
1
0

11'.

of them bequeath b

Hence b0 =

1

to their offsprings so that ,i,*(b ) - ,i,•(bO) =
1

The discrete nature of

,i,

11' (

1-ir) •

* follows from the discrete
nature of the

shock that impinges upon an agent's life or death in the second period.
An alternative specificatio n of uncertain lifetime, such as the one used
by Sheshinski and Weiss ( 1981), might result in a bequest distributio n
with a continuous support.
here

our

intuitive

In any event. given the

justificatio n

for

the

above

steady

state bequest

equilibrium is formalized in appendix A and is summarized by figure 1.

(INSERT FIGURE 1]
The lifetime consumption allocation of an
equilibrium clearly depends upon

c (b)
1

=w+

b - s(b,1)

c2'b) = s(b, 1)

where b c {bk' k = 0, 1,2, ••• }.

agent

his bequest and is given by

in

the

above
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Our explicit characterizatio n of the bequest equilibrium allows us to
compare each agent's expected lifetime utility under the two hypothetical
market structures:

the unrestricted annuity regime of section 2 and the

restricted savings opportunities of this section.

However, the temporal

nature of our model and the diversity in agents'

initial weal th in the

bequest equilibrium raise a number of interesting conceptual problems in
deriving Pareto rankings of the two equilibria.

We examine these issues
and their implications in the remainder of this section. 4

Welfare Comparison
Recall

that

consumption

of

in
an

the

stationary

agent

whose

bequest

equilibrium,

initial real

the

lifetime

wealth consists of an

endowment, w, and a bequest, b, is given by

c (b) = w + b - s(b,1),
1

(3.8)

c (b) = s(b,1), if the agent lives through his second period.
2
In contrast, the stationary annuity equilibrium of section 2 is charac
terized

by

the

absence

of

any

bequests,

and

the

associated

lifetime

consumption allocation is given by

c1

w

= 1+1T
w

02 = 1+1T

'

if the agent lives through his second period.

An important aspect of a welfare comparison of these two equilibria
clearly involves a comparison of each agent's expected utility under the
two regimes.

However, in temporal models with agents of qifferent birth

dates, there seems to be some latitude in specifying the information on
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which

the

expected utilities of unborn

surprisin gly,

the welfare ranking

agents

are condition ed.

of allocation s

(3.8)

and

(3.9)

Not
may

indeed depend on informatio n assumptio ns regarding agents' initial wealth.
Thts sensitivi ty of the welfare

ranking to the informatio n assumptio ns

embedded in the optimalit y criterion has been demonstra ted in a different
context by Muench ( 1977) and Peled ( 1982).

Because of this we compare

allocatio ns (3.8) and (3.9) under two optimality criteria and then comment
on the appropria teness of each for our model.
Consider

first

condition ing

the

expected utility associate d with

allocatio ns (3.8) and (3.9) on the same informatio n that agents have when
making their first period decisions .

That is, we evaluate the expected

utility of these allocation s condition ed on the bequest level.

For the

bequest equilibriu m, these expected utilities are given by

(3.10)

V(b) : u(w+b-s(b ,1)) + w u(s(b,1)) , b

t

{bk' k:0,1,2 ••• }.

On the other hand, bequests are uniformly zero in the annuity regime,
so that the expected utility of all agents is given by

EU

(3.11)

a

:

( 1+1r) u

w
c-,)
.
+'If

We say that allocation (3.9) is condition ally preferred to allocation
(3.8)

if

V(b) < EU a for all b

t

{bk' k:0, 1,2, ••• }.
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It is straight forward, however, to generate examples that demonstrate the
absence of any general conclusions which can be made on the basis of such
a

criterion.

Notice

that,

in

essence,

tradeoff between a real bequest b

~

this

comparison

involves

the

0 along with a real rate of return of

unity on the one hand and a zero bequest but a rate of return on savings
that equals 1/w on the other.

It is clear that while agents with very low

bequests will invariably prefer allocation (3.9), agents with sufficiently
high

bequests

will,

in

general,

prefer

( 3. 8).

However,

given

a

sufficiently low survival probability, agents with any bequest level may
conditionally prefer allocation (3.9). 5
Alternatively,

allocations

(3.8)

and

(3.9)

can be compared

in

the

unconditional expected utilities sense, that is calculated on the basis of
the

bequest

distribution 1¥*.

The

unconditioned

expected

utility

associated with (3.8) is given by

(3.12)

EUb

= EbV{b) = /{u[w+b-s(b,1))]

+ wu[s(b,1)]} d1¥*(b)

The relevant unconditioned expected utility associated with (3.9} is still

EU a in

(3. 11).

We say that allocation ( 3. 9) is unconditionally preferred

to (3.8) if

(3. 13)

EUb < EU •
a

We

now

preferences,
(3. 8).

which

show

that

allocation

under
( 3. 9)

certain
is,

additional

in fact,

mild

restrictions

uncondi ti on ally preferred to

Our discussion takes the form of a sufficient condition
(3.13)

holds with strict

inequality.

on

under

This sufficient condition,
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though satisfied by a large class of economica lly relevant specifica tions
of the economy, is not easily interpreta ble in terms of restrictio ns on
preferenc es,

endowments or survival probabili ties, as it involves these

features in a rather complex way.
Utilizing the concave,

additivel y separable nature of agents'

preferenc es, we have that for any b

> 0,

1
V(b) = (1+,r)(-r-u
<w+b-s(b ,1)) + f-u<s(b, 1)))
+ir
+,r
1
w-1
(w+b) + ,-S(b,
< ( 1+,r )u[ ~+ir
1)).
+,r
Hence,
(3.14)

EUb

<

(1+,r)E{u[ 1 (w+b) + ~- 1s(b,1))},
1+,r
+'11'

where the expectatio n E{ } is taken with respect to the real bequest distribution

~*•

Next we would like· to further bound the RHS of (3.14) from

above by using the Jensen inequalit y.
the

presence of s(b, 1)

in

(3.14),

But even though u( ) is concave,
(with a negative coefficie nt), may

vitiate the concavity in b of the function the expected value of which is
carried out in (3.14).

Neverthel ess, if the concavity of s(•, 1) is not

"too large," we may proceed by using the Jensen inequalit y on (3.14) to
get: 6

1
1
EUb < (1+,r)u(w+ ~
, {b-(1-w)s (b,1)}].
1+'II'
+,r
Finally, recall that in the bequest equilibriu m, the average bequest per
·young

agent

equals

the

average

estate

expected value of b-( 1-ir) s ( b, 1) is zero.

per

young

agent,

so

that

the

Consequen tly, EUb < EU a, as was

asserted.

j
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The

fact

that

(with

some

restriction

on

preferences)

the

annuity

equilibrium allocation is unconditionall y preferred to the bequest
equilibrium allocation

can be questioned on the

following

basis:

the

unconditional expected utility concept used to prove the above result is
an

appropriate representation of preferences of agents

who

are

around

prior to the realization of their own bequests which are perceived to be
distributed according to "1*(

)•

In contrast, the information and timing

specifications of the model endow agents at birth with the knowledge of
their bequest.

As Peled

( 1982) has argued elsewhere, this observation

suggests a generic nonoptimality in the unconditional sense of any com
petitive equilibrium that obtains when agents are barred from taking any
action before observing the realization of the conditioning event.
is generally the case because some trades which are beneficial
unconditional

sense,

such

realizations, are excluded.
allocation
(3.8)

(3.9)

as

sharing

the

risks

This
in the

associated with these

Moreover, notice that the annuity equilibrium

not only dominates the bequest equilibrium allocation

in the unconditional sense, but it is also optimal in this sense.

How is it possible, then, to obtain an unconditionally optimal allocation
as

a

decentralized

equilibrium

without

utilizing

the

sorts

pre-endowment trades which are physically impossible in our model?

of
The

answer is given by the fact that the conditioning event in our model -
the

random endowment at birth -- is endogenously determined

generation by the decision of the previous one.

for

each

By opening markets for

perfect annuities we eliminate bequests altogether and thereby completely
degenerate the randomness of the conditioning event.
annuity

markets

remove

the

distinction

between

Put differently, the
unconditional

conditional expected utilities with respect to bequests.

and

In contrast, the
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randomness

in agents'

initial conditions studied by Muench

(1977)

and

Peled (1982) was not endogenous in this sense and consequently results in
a generic nonoptimali ty in the unconditional sense of decentralized

...

equilibria.
cratic

Likewise, if in our model agents were subject to idiosyn-

exogenous

shocks at

birth,

in

addition

to

size of their

the

bequest, unconditional optimality would not be displayed by competitive
equilibria.
To make these points somewhat more concrete, we now consider
welfare

the

implications of an actual shift from one market structure to

another.

Notice

that

the

previous

analysis was

confined

to

welfare

comparisons of allocations associated with the steady state of two
alternative equilibria.

As such,

the analysis abstracted from the

implications of a regime shift on the welfare of those generations who are
alive during the transition from one steady state to another.

It

is

evident that such an analysis will depend very much qn the precise way in
which the regime shift is implemented.

Here we consider the simplest way

of examining such transition effects.
Imagine that at some time t -1, t
0
0

~

state equilibrium of the bequest regime.

2, the economy is in the steady
At the end of t -1 each young
0

agent holds savings in the form of a paper asset which was accumulated
with the understanding that the real of return would be unity.
bequest equilibrium, unborn agents of generation t +j, j
0
inherited

real

bequests distributed

~

according to , * (•).

In the

0, would have
Consequently

their consumption levels would have been described by (3.8).
The policy experiment consists of an announcement by the government
at

the

end

of

period

t 0 -1

(after

consumption

has

taken

place)

that

restrictions on annuity markets are removed for all periods t +j, j > O.
0
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In appendix B we show that the resulting equilibrium has the property that
bequests will be eliminated as of time t 0 and the associated consumption
levels given by

c
(3.15)

2,t 0 -1

= ~s(b,1), for some R > 1

Hence we may evaluate the effect of this regime shift on the welfare
of the

unborn generations t

previous section.

>

-

t

0

by appealing to the results of the

In particular, while we may say that allocation (3. 15)

is, under certain mild restrictions on preferences, unconditionally
preferr.ed to the allocation implied by the continuation of the bequest
regime,

no general ranking is possible on the basis of the conditional

criterion.
welfare

However,

effects

there

regarding

are

no

such ambiguities

the members

clearly better off under (3.15) because

of generation

R exceeds

in

evaluating the

t 0 -1.

the rate of return they

would receive in the absence of the regime shift, namely unity.
above implementation scheme allows for

They are

Thus the

the transition from the bequest

regime to the annuity regime in a decentralized way and in which the
transition generation gains from the shift.
Notice,

however,

that

the

above

scheme

precludes any non-trivial

announcement effects, in the sense that the policy is implemented in a way
that does not allow agents to respond to perceived changes in rates of
return.

While the analysis of these more general policy shifts is clearly

beyond the scope of this paper, we should emphasize that such an exercise
is considerably more complicated and may lead to situations in which some
members of transitional generations are adversely affected.

Consequently,
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some degree of government intervention may be necessary to prevent adverse
effects of an announced regime change on the current old.

But as section

2 points out, once private annuity markets have been set up in environmetlts where firms do not face any difficulties in discriminating between
members of different groups, there are no welfare gains associated with
any maintained government intervention in the annuity markets.

In section

.q we examine one such .obstacle to discriminatory behavior on the part of

firms -- private information with respect to survival probabilities -- and
derive its sharply different implications regarding the desirability of
government intervention •

.q.

Annuity Markets and Social Security in the Presence of Private
Information
We now turn our attention to the performance of the economy in the

presence of private information regarding survival probabilities.

Recent

developments in the literature regarding the economics of information have
pointed

out the large differences between the properties of classical

Walrasian equilibria and information equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which
buyers

and

sellers

have

private information regarding the qualitative

nature of the good which is being bought and sold.

As is well documented

in the literature, these differences relate to both the existence and
optimality of competitive equilibria.

Of particular

interest

for

the

problem at hand is the widely lmown result obtained by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976] and Wilson (1977].among others, that even when competitive
equilibria· exist

under

such

circumstances,

allocations need not be Pareto Optimal.

the

associated

equilibrium

"
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On the other hand,
literature
need

to

one · of the prime

justifications given

in

the

for a government-run social security program is the alleged

correct

various

sorts

of market

inefficient forms of risk sharing.

failures

which

give

rise

to

Diamond [ 1977], for example, asserts

that there are a number of market failures in the present U.S.
which a social security· system could help alleviate.

economy

While Diamond does

not provide a model of the reasons for these alleged market failures, he
does discuss in depth the problems of insuring the risks associated with a
varying length of working life.
to

insure

problems.
in

such

risks

face

Prominent among these are that attempts

severe moral

hazard

and

adverse

selection

Both problems arise due to the existence of private information

those markets.

While this section does not attempt to model the

specific phenomena alluded to by Diamond, we try to capture the essence of
his

arguments

in

favor

of government

intervention

by considering the

nature of competitive annuity markets in the presence of private infor
mation regarding survival probabilities.

This is done by showing that the

framework developed by Rothschild and Stiglitz and Wilson for dealing with
the nature of competitive insurance markets in the presence of piivate

information can be easily extended to deal with annuity markets.
this is done,

Once

the resulting competitive equilibrium is shown to be, in

general, nonoptimal, so that there is, in principle, a Pareto improving
role for the government in such economies.

Moreover, it turns out that

the set of optimally designed mandatory social security regimes which lead
to an equilibrium which Pareto dominates the non-interventio n equilibrium
allows for the co-existence of private annuity markets and the government
run program.

Furthermore, while the government annuities are actuarially

fair in an economy-wide sense, the resulting equilibrium in the residual
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private annuity market is a separating one so that rates of return on
privately issued annuities are actuarially fair in a group specific sense.
Hence private and public modes of savings will not be perfect subistitutes
froni the point of view of the individual agents in the system.

While one

group of agents would always like to invest more in the public program,
another group of agents, who view private market rates of return para"'.'
meterically, would like to opt out of the system.

However, were they

allowed to do so, the resulting equilibrium would be one in which they
would be uniformly worse off.

The Competitive Annuity Market
Excepting our specification of the information sets of agents,
economy to be discussed is the same as that analyzed in section 2.

the
With

respect to these information sets, we assume that agents in our economy
know their own survival probabilities as well as how many

,r A

individuals there are in the economy at any given moment.

Similarly, the

government knows the values of ,rA'
there are y-type B agents.

ir

and

ir

8-type

8 , and y, where for each type A agent,

However, no agent, including the government,

knows whether any other particular individual belongs to group A or B.
For convenience, we assume that

ir

8 >

ir

A•

Analogous to Rothschild and

Stiglitz and Wilson, we define an annuity policy a as a two-dimensional
vector

[s a,Ra]

so

th at

if

a young

agent

purchases

the

policy

a his

a a if he lives two
consumption vector (c ,c ) becomes (w-s a ,Rs)
periods an d
1 2

(w-sa,O)

if he lives only one perod.

Notice

the

above

specification

implies that sellers specifiy both "prices and quantities" (R and s) in
annuity contracts.

Rothschild and Stiglitz argue at length that price and

quantity competition coupled with free entry into insurance markets is the

1
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appro priate notion of compe tition in these sorts of marke
ts.

In

partic ular, they point out that price compe tition is clearl y
a specia l
case of price and quanti ty compe tition becaus e nothin g in the
defini tion
of the latter preven ts firms from offeri ng for sale a set of
annuit ies
which can be bought in differ ent quant ities, but which have the
same rate
of return if the purcha ser surviv es.

Hence, firms which adopt pure price

strate gies cannot hope to succes sfully compete with firms who
adopt mixed
price and quanti ty strate gies.
The intere sted reader is referr ed to
Rothsc hild and Stigli tz for a more detail ed discus sion of this point.
Since the consumption vector of each young agent can be repres
ented
by the annuit y policy that he purcha ses, the expect ed utilit y
of agent i
assoc iated with variou s consum ption plans can be repres ented
by an
i
indire ct utilit y functi on V,
define d over the set of insura nce polici es,

where Vi(•) is given by

( 4. 1)

i

V (R,s)

= u(w-s)

+ wiu(R s), i

= A,B

[INSERT FIGURE 2]

Hence for any given Rand s, the slope of the indiff erence curve
of a
young member of group i, is given by

de
(4.2)

Given

dc

u'(Rs)
= - wi u 1 (w-s)' 1 = A,B
2

our

1

assum ptions

on

(repre sented in figure 2 by

u (. ) t
a)

for

any

given

contr act

(s a ,R a ),

the slope of a type B indiff erence curve,

IB, will be in absolu te value, greate r than a type A indiff erence curve,
IA.

Put altern ativel y, for any given rate of return RI. a type B young
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person would like to purchase a larger number of annuities than a type A
young person (a A and a B in figure 2).
Because of the serious and as yet unresolved controversi es in the
lit~rature regarding the appropriate definition of equilibrium for markets
such as these, we consider Wilson's two alternative definition s of
equilibrium , both of which are motivated by· the desire to describe an
equilibrium set of policies for a situation in which firms can costlessly
enter the market.

Because of the non-random and time independent nature

of endowments and paper asset supply, and the fact that the structure of
the population does not change over time, we confine ourselves to
characteriz ations of the stationary equilibrium of the economy.
A Rothschild/ Stiglitz (E1) equlibrium, which was used in section 2,
is a set of contracts such that when agents choose contracts to maximize
their

expected utility,

expected

(i)

negative profits,

equilibrium set that,
Rothschild

and

Nash-Courno t

in

and

(ii)

if offered,

Stigli tz

type

no contract in the equilibrium set makes

that

there

is no contract

outside the

will make a nonnegative profit.

point

out,

the

each

firm

assumes

E1

equilibrium
that

the

is

As

of

the

contracts

its

competitors offer are independent of its own actions.
A Wilson (E2) equilibrium is the same as the E 1 equilibrium except
that

firms'

expectation s are modified

by assuming that each firm will

correctly anticipate which of those policies that are offered by other
firms will become unprofitable as a consequence of any changes in its own
policies.

The firm then offers a new policy only if it makes nonnegative

profits after the other firms have made the expected adjustment in their
policy offers.
We
results:

first

consider the

E1

equilibrium and

establish

the

following

,,
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(i)

There cannot be an E1 pooling equilibrium

(ii)

If an E1 equilibrium exists,

it is a separating equilibrium

1
where type A agents buy the contract (s ,;)
and type B buy the
1

contract

,r B

1

(-:--w
+1r, - ) .

1 B

,rB

A

The quantity of annuities, s 1 ,

purchased

by a type A agent maximizes his utility given an intertemporal
rate

of

return

of

1/irA,

and

satisfies the self-selection

constraint for type B agents:

(iii)

For sufficiently small values of y

> 0, i.e., a relatively

small number of type B agents, there does not exist an E1
annuity market equilibrium.

Because of the similarity of our model to that of Rothschild and Stiglitz
and Wilson, we demonstrate (i),

(ii)

and (iii) primarily via geometric

arguments.
A simple graphical argument demonstrates that there cannot be an E1
pooling equilibrum, i.e., an equilibrium in which members of both groups
buy the same policy (s,R).

Denote by si (R) the unconstrained, utility

maximizing purchase of annuities that pay R by type i agent,

i = A,B.

Zero profits in an equilibrium in which_ both groups face the same return
on annuities, ~. requires that

( 4. 3)
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Given

that

s

= s

A

= s

B

in

a

it

stationary pooling equilibrium,

is

immediately evident from (4.3) that

If =

(4.4)

so that 1hr 8

<R<

1/,r A.

The point a in figure 3 depicts some arbitrary

E1 pooling equilibrium.

[INSERT FIGURE 3]

Given our results from Figure 2 and the relative slopes of the type A
and

B indifference

curves,

it

follows

that

there

always

exists

some

contract A, near a, which if offered, is preferred by group A, but not by
group B.

Hence, if offered, it will be exclusively bought by members of

group A which from the point of view of firms is the low risk group;
therefore the firm will earn nonnegative profits.

But the existence of

such a contract contradicts the second part of the definition of an E1
equilibrium.

Because a similar argument can be made for any point a on

the (w,Rw) line, it follows that .!!2. E1 pooling equilibrium exists for the
industry in question.

Therefore, if an E1 equilibrium exists, it must be

a separating equilibrium.

[INSERT FIGURE 4]

To

establish

(ii)

we

begin

by

noting

that,

as

in

the

pooling

equilibrium, we require that each contract offered earns zero profits.
This in turn implies that in Figure 4 the low risk contract must lie on
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the (w,w/1rA) line while the high risk contra ct must lie on
the (w,w/1r )
8
line.
From sectio n 2, the contra ct on the (w,w/1r ) line that is
most
8
prefer red by members of group B equate s planne d consum
ption in both
period s of their life.
Figure 4.

This alloca tion corres ponds to the contra ct C in

On the other hand, members of group A would, of all contra cts

on the (w,w/1rA) line prefer D, which like C, equate s planne
d consum ption
in both period s of the agent' s life.
However, contra ct D domin ates contra ct C from the point of
view of
members of group B. Hence, if both C and D are offere d, all
agents will
purcha se D.

Given privat e inform ation, all indivi duals who demand D must

be sold D.

But since D is actuar ially fair for members of group A only,

profit s will neces sarily be negati ve if members of group B
purcha se it.
Hence, the contra ct (C,D) cannot be a separa ting equilb irum.

It follow s

that a separa ting E1 equilib rium contra ct for group A must
not be more
attrac tive to the members of group B than contra ct C.
A
c 2 (E)

denote first

which

lies

along

Lettin g c~(E) and

and second period consum ption under some contra ct E
{w,whrA)

and

recall ing

that

c~ = c~ = w/(1+1r 8 ),

we

requir e that

(4.5)

for the contra ct C and E to be a separa ting equili brium .

Hence if an E1

equili brium exists , the quanti ty of annuit ies that pay 1/1rA
purcha sed by a
type A indivi dual, s , solve the follow ing proble m:
1

(4.6)

Max u(w-s) + 1rA u(s/1rA)
s

!.
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subject to

(4,7)

However, because the constrain t is clearly binding, we may replace the
weak

inequalit y

in

(4.7)

with

strict

equality.

Hence,

the

set

of

potential E1 equilibri a can be found by examining the solutions of

(4.8)

It is straightfo rward to verify that there always exist two solutions to
(4.8), (correspon ding to the points E and E in figure 4), where the indif
1
ference curve of a type Bagent, I , intersect s the (w,w/irA) line. Since
5
the indifferen ce curve of the represent ative type A agent through point E
1
always lies below the one going through point E, the E1 equilibriu m is
given by (C ,E), if it exists.
Rothschil d

and

Stiglitz,

equilibrUJ~ which,

to

However, for the reasons pointed out by
be discussed

therefore ,

implies

below,

that

an

E1

(C,E)

may

not

be

an

aquilibriu m does not

necessari ly exist.

[INSERT FIGURE 5]

To establish (iii) we begin by considerin g the contract F in figure 5
which lies above both IA and IB.

If Fis offered, members of both group B

and A will purchase it in preferenc e to contracts C and E, respectiv ely.
If it makes nonnegati ve profit when both groups buy it, F clearly upsets
the potential E 1 separatin g equilibriu m (C,E).

This is the case if the

aggregate actuarial ly fair line is given by (w, RW), while this is not the
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case if that line is given by (w, Rw).

Hence in the former case, there

does not exist an E1 equilibrium while in the latter case there does.
Notice then that, from equation {4.4), the class of economies for which an
E1 equilibrium exists is monotonically increasing in r, since

R decreases

monotonically in y.
Before considering the
exists,

optimality of the

E1 equilibrium when

we turn our attention to the class of E2 equilibria.

it

Wilson

demonstrates, in a more general context, that if an E1 equilibrium exists,
it is also an E2 equilibrium.

Given the above results, we need only

illustrate that an E2 equilibrium exists when the E1 equilibrium does not.
Such

a

case

equilibrium.

is

displayed

in

Figure

6.

Suppose

that

F is

an

E2

Can it be broken by the contract A as was the case with the

E1 equilibrium?

To see that it cannot, notice that now, before offering

A, firms realize that if it is offered only type B people will purchase.
contract F which will therefore be unprofitable and withdrawn.

As such,

if A is offered, it is expected that members of both groups will buy it.

But under those conditions, the contract A will yield negative profits.

As a result. no firm will offer the contract A.

In a similar way,

[INSERT FIGURE 6]

it can be shown that there does not exist any contract which will break
the

proposed

equilibrium.

Hence the E2 equilibrium is given by the

contract F.
In general, then, one can derive the E2 equilibrium as follows:

when

the parameters of the problem are such that an E1 equilibrium exists, the
E1 and E2 equilibria are the same and are given by the solution to {4.6);
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when the E1 equilibrium does not exist, the E2 equilibrium is a pooling
equilibrium which may be found by solving

and then offering the contract (s,R) where ff is given by (4.4).
In

summary,

equilibria

that

this
can

subsection
be

shown

to

outlines
exist

two
in

our

notions

of

economy.

competitive
Those

two

equilibria concepts, suggested by Wilson and Rothschild-Stig litz, involve
strategic considerations on the part of the competing firms.
Townsend

( 1979)

Prescott and

provide compelling arguments for the nonexistence of a

nonstrategic competitive equilibrium in environments of which ours is a
special case.

We should note, however, that our discussion of competitive

equilibria is not ment to be exhaustive.

Rather, we require some notion

of a competitive equilibrium that can be shown to exist in our adverse
selection economy in order to evaluate

the desirability of government

intervention.

The Welfare Improving Role of Mandatory Social Security
The above examples illustrate the fact that, with private information
regarding survival probabilities, the presence of high risk individuals,
i.e., type B agents who have a high probability of living and therefore of
collecting on their annuity contracts, exerts a negative externality on
the type A individuals, i.e., those agents who have a low probability of
surviving and therefore of collecting on their annuity contracts.

In the

case where an E 1 equilibrium exists contracts-(C ,E) in (Figure 4 )-this
externality is purely destructive in that while group A is worse off than
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I

they would be in the absence of private information (IA versus IA), group
B is

not

better

off.

On

the

other

hand,

in

the

case

where

no

E1

equilibrium exists and the economy is at an E2 equilibrium (Figure 6),
while group A is still worse off, at least the members of group B are
better off than they would be in the absence of private information.
Given the existence of these negative externalities, it should not
come as a surprise that there exist Pareto improving policies which the
government can undertake.

Needless to say, in considering such policies,

we restrict ourselves, a priori, to interventions which do not require
that the government be able to distinguish between agents of different
types.
that

Notice that the definitions of the E 1 and E2 equilibria impose
e.ach contract which

profit.

is purchased

in

equilibrium earn

nonnegative

But, as Wilson points out, this restriction arises because of the

expectations

that

firms

have

regarding

policy on its aggregate profits.
the self-selection problem.

the

effect

of

an

unprofitable

It does not arise as a consequence of

The above two observations taken together

imply that the search for allocations which are superior to those obtained
by the

private equilibrium can be restricted to the class of contracts

which individually may yield negative profit but which together achieve
nonnegative

profits.

equilibria,

we consider two cases for

Corresponding to

the

two

possible

a potential role

decentralized
for

government

intervention in the annuity markets:

Case I

E2 Pooling Equilibrium

As discussed above, the E2 pooling equilibrium is characterized by
the solution to (4.9), so that the point F in Figure 7 characterizes the
equilibrium allocation

with

members

of

each

group

having

the

planned
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In genera l,

there exist a

continu um of mandato ry social securit y systems that Pareto domina te the
E2
pooling

equilib rium

when

combined

re~idua l demands for annuit ies.

with

private

markets

which

satisfy

Here we discuss only two such policie s in

order to convinc e the reader of their existen ce and genera l charac
ter!sties.

Imagine

that

the

governm ent

introdu ces

a

manada tory

securit y system which require s that all agents contrib ute x' ,0

social

< x' < x,

during the first period of their life and receive Rx' during the second
period of their life if they survive , where R is the aggrega te actuar
ially
fair rate of return that is determi ned by ( 4. 4).

The governm ent then

permits the private market to satisfy any residua l demand for annuit
ies.
Members of both groups can
vector,

(w-x' ,x'lh.

annuity market

then

be viewed

as

having

a new endowment

This creates opport unities for a differe nt private

equilib rium which can

be

studied

by drawing

the group

specifi c actuar ially fair budget lines origina ting from the transfo
rmed
endowment.

In figure 7, these corresp ond to the broken

(T, x'R + w,-x') and (T, x'R
.....
... A

w,-x').
•'II'
.. "B

For the particu lar

budget
x'

lines

conside red in

figure 7, the resulti ng equilib rium allocat ions for groups A and B
are
given by the points E and C corresp onding to the indiffe rence curves I
IA
and I 0 .
8

Notice then that while we start with an E2 pooling equilib rium

(at F) the result of combin ing a mandato ry social securit y contrib ution
x'
with private annuity markets is a separat ing equilib rium in the private
sector.

That such a separat ing equilib rium exists is eviden t from the

fact that the aggreg ate actuar ially fair budget line (w,wR) lies uniform
ly

'
below I A.

(Recall that to upset a separat ing equilib rium, we require that

there exist a contrac t on the aggrega te actuar ially fair

line that

is

preferr ed

Moreov er,

in

by group A to

their

self-se lected

contra ct).

,
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comparing the. non-inter vention equilibriu m allocation (F) and that which
is obtained under the social security regime (E and C) , we see that while
the utility level of group Bis unaffecte d, group A is strictly better off
under the interventi on regime

(IA

vs. I~).

However, as is evident from

figure 7, for social security contribut ions below x', both groups will be
made worse off at the resulting equilibriu m as compared to allocation s F.
Thus,

x'

in

figure

7 correspon ds

to

the minimal

social

security

contribu tion that improves upon the complete ly decentra lized pooling
equilibriu m.

The fact that a contribut ion of x' to the social security

system leaves the welfare level of group B unaffecte d, implies that x' may
be determine d by finding the intersecti on of a budget line with a slope of
1Irr B tangent

to I~ and

Formally,

represent s a utility level of u(w-x)

r:

the economy-wide actuarial ly fair
+

ir

budget line.

8 u(Rx), while at

point C, the lifetime consumpti on of a type B agent is given by

B

B

- 1
c, = c2 = (w-x'+ir 8 x 1 R),---.
+irs

u----

U1:U\,;lw t

~

"

I

~- . ..__ __ , ..... ~-.....
1.,U'C

.:>V~UVJ.UU

·... ...,

Alternati vely, consider a contribut ion to the social security program
that equals x, the voluntary savings at the initial equilibriu m point F.
Drawing

group specific actuarial ly fair

budget

lines

from

that

point,

(dotted lines in figure 7), it can be shown that a resulting separatin g
.equilibriu m occurs at points K and J.
ence curve labelled

I

Type B agents are on the indiffer-

r 8 , which intersect s the type A agents' budget line
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and determines point J.

As is evident from figure 7, both groups are

better off w1 th these allocations than with allocation F.

Also, since

first period consumption at K and J is lower than at F, it is clear that
aggregate savings are higher with social security contribution of size x.
While

the two levels of social

security contributions discussed above

Pareto dominate the completely decentralized equilibrium,
mutually

noncomparable.

Group

A is

better

off with

a

they · are

smaller

social

security contribution (point B) than with the larger contribution (point

J),

while

the

converse holds

associated with

all

for

intermediate

group B.

In fact,

the equilibria

levels of contributions

are

all

noncomparable in this way while each of them Pareto dominates the pooling
equilibrium F.

Although we have demonstrated that aggregate savings level

can increase as a result of such a program, this effect may depend on the
size of the mandatory contributions.

Case II

E1 Separating Equilibrium

Unlike

Case

I,

if

we

begin

from

a

separating

equilibrium,

the

existence of a Pareto improving social security scheme is not guaranteed•
Figure 8 depicts a case where it does exist, but as will become evident
below, our success involves a fairly special structure of preferences.

We

begin with a separating equilibium with group A at point E, and group Bat
point C.

A mandatory contribution to a social security program in which

annuities have a real rate of return of
actuarially fair

R gives

rise to the group specific

(broken) budget lines in figure 8.

Private annuities

purchased by group B then attain allocation G along indifference curve

r 8' .

If that curve intersects group A's budget line at a point like H, which is
preferred to point E by group A, we have a separating equilibrium that

,
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dominates

the decentralized one.

Al though there is nothing that

guarantees this possibility in general,

one cannot presume the

Pareto

optimality of the separating decentralized equilibrium.
In concludng this section, we note that while there are still ongoing
and unresolved controversies in the literature regarding the appropriate
concept of equilibrium for private information economies such as those
studied here, our results are quite encouraging in that they suggest an
important motive for mandatory social security.
develops a framework which allows for

Furthermore, the model

the co-existence of public and

private annuities which are not perfect substitutes from the point of the
view of economic agents in the system.

In this vein, it is interesting to

note that in the social security equilibrium the members of group A obtain
a higher rate of return on private annuities than on their contributions
to the social security system.

As a result, any individual member of

group A would like to withdraw from the public plan.

This, of course, is

why the program must be mandatory since if group A were allowed to opt out
the resulting equilibrium would be one in which the members of group A and
B are worse off~

Tn

~ 11 m,

then , the analysis not only allows for , but is

crucially dependent upon the imperfect substitutabilit y of private and
public annuities.

Moreover, our ability to decompose total annuities into

public and private annuities allows us to analyze the welfare effects of
increases in the magnitude of contributions to the social security system
with group A desiring smaller (up to some point) mandatory contributions
and group B wanting larger (up to some point) contributions.
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5.

Conclusion
This paper has investigated the nature of market structures that are

capable of supporting

optimal

allocations

in environment s where there

extst diversity with respect to survival probabiliti es.
individual

survival

probabilit ies

are public

We find that when

informatio n,

optimal

allocations have the property that ex ante marginal rates of substitution
between consumption in different periods are not equalized across members
of different groups.

Moreover, decentralize d annuity markets support such

an allocation by offering group specific actuarially fair annuities as
opposed to economy-wi de actuariall v fair annuities.

However, when

individual survival probabilitie s are private information , there can be no
presumption

that

competitive equilibria result

in optimal

allocations .

For a large class of economies, mandatory social security programs, which
are actuarially fair in an aggregate sense, when coupled with residual
private annuity markets,

lead to an equilibrium which Pareto dominates

that of the non-interve ntion regime.

Moreover, because the model allows

for the co-existenc e of public and private annuities which are non-perfect
substitutes for

each other,

it will not be

true

that

an

increase

in

savings in the form of contribution s to Social Security causes an equal
displacemen t of private, voluntary savings.

In fact, it may even increase

aggregate savings.
Our

results

discussing

the

taken
nature

together
of

indicate

potential

the

welfare

potential
enhancing

danger

in

government

interventio ns by imposing a priori market restriction s rather than
conducting · the analysis within fully specified models which tie market
failures to the fundamental features of the underlying environment which
cause

them.

Thus,

the

nature

of optimally designed

social

security

~
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systems

in

environments

where

survival

probabilities

are

public

information, but annuity markets are excluded by fiat is very different
from the mandatory social security system which is appropriate for
environments where survival probabilities is private information.
Finally, the paper provides a framework for analyzing the problems of
insuring the risks associated with varying lengths of working life or
private information regarding the productivity of human capital.

At this

point, we can only conjecture that the resulting policy implications will
be quite different than those derived from a model in which such markets
are a priori excluded.
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Appendix A
Before characterizing the unique stationary bequest equilibrium, we
verify that every allocation associated with a solution to equations (3.1)
- E>~.4) is feasible •

. The resource constraint of this exchange economy is given by

t >1

(A. 1)

where
(A.2)

and
c 2t(b) = R(t)s(b,R(t)).
Substituting (A.2) and (A.3) into (A.1) implies
(A.4)

Jbd't+l(b) - /s(b,R(t+1))dft +l(b) + w/R(t)s(b,R(t)) d,t(b) = 0.

Since savings are nonnegative, ,i,t(z) = 0, z < 0 for all t.

Using this

fact and the transition law for the bequest distribution (3. 4), the first
term in (A.4) can be rewritten as
Jbd1j,t+l(b) = /bd{w+(1-1r)1j,t [h(b/R(t),R(t))]}
: (1-w)Jbd1j,t[h(b /R(t),R(t))]

= (1-w)/R(t)s(z,R (t))d1j,t(z),

where the last equality comes from defining z = h[b/R(t) ,R(t)], so that b

= R(t)s(z,R(t)).
(A.5)

Consequently, (A.4) is equivalent to

R(t)/s(b,R(t))d tt(b) - /s(b,R(t+1))d1j, t+l(b) = 0,

which holds whenever (3.2) and (3.3) hold.
Next, we prove that if 't

=,

for all t

> 1 then R(t) = 1

Substitution of (A.5) into (A.4) and the fact that 1jlt = 't+l =
(A.6)

,i,,

ll- t

> 1.

yields

/bd1j,(b) = (1-w) I R(t)s(b,R(t))dt (b)

which equates average real bequests with the average estate of deceased
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agents per young person.

As noted above, the concavit y and monoton icity

of u(•) is sufficie nt to deduce that Rs(b,R) is an increasi ng function of
R.

Since the LHS of (A.6)

solution R for a given
for all t.

lj,,

is

independ ent of time,

this solution is unique.

if (A.6) has any

Therefo re, R{t) = R

It then follows immedia tely from (A.5) that R = 1.

Denote by~•(•) the stationa ry equilibr ium real bequest distribu tion.
Utilizin g (3.4), the nonnega tivity constrai nt on s, and properti es (i) (iii) of s(• ,R) from section 2, we can now explicit ly solve for 1j,*(•).
The stationa ry real bequest distribu tion should satisfy
1j,*(z)

= 11'

+ (1-ir)'!j,* [h(z,1)]

z > 0

(A.7)
1j,*(z) = o

z

< o.

Define the followin g sequence of real bequest levels:

(A.8)
k = 1,2, ••••

Since O < as(b,1)/ ab < 1 and s(0,1) > O the above sequence satisfie s

and
lim bk= b*,
k+"'

where b* is such that s(b*,1) = b*.
savings of a person inheriti ng

bk_ ,
1

Notice that fork~ 1, bk is the real
so

that

bk_ 1

=

h(bk,1).

Since

= b 1 , for b ~O, savings levels below b can only be
1
generate d by negative bequests . That is, h(z,1) < O for z e [O,b ). From
1
s(b,1)

~

s(0,1)

(A. 7) it then follows that
~•(z)

= ir,

For z e [b ,b ), h(z,1)
1 2
and hence

£

[O,b ), so that 'lj,*[h_(z,1)] =
1

11'

in this range,
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In gene ral,
t*Cz)

k-1
:

j

E ( 1-ir )
j:0

I' ,

for z

e [

bk_1 , bk) , k = 1, 2, ••••

The W'lique (by cons truc tion ) stati onar y dist
ribu tion of real bequ ests is
then give n by (A.8) and (A.9 ). It is read ily
veri fied that
t*(b *) = lim $*(b k)
k....,

= lim

k-1

t

k_, j:O

(1-w)jw

=1

which com plete s our proo f.
Appendix B
The market

stru ctur e change

sugg ested

in

the

text

invo lves ,

in

effe ct, rene ging on claim s to consumption
intie ri ted by young members of
gene ratio n t • These agen ts, ther efor e,
each have a weal th of w in the
0
firs t perio d and save via annu ities that pay
a real rate of retu rn of 1/1r
to surv ivor s. On the othe r hand , old mem
bers of gene ratio n t -1 hold the
0
claim s they acqu ired when young. Spe cific
ally , a surv ivor of gene ratio n
t -1 who inhe rited b when young, hold s claim
0
s to s(b, 1) unit s of the good
at t 0 • We show next that zero prof its in
the· savi ngs indu stry at perio d
t 0 invo lve a payo ff to thes e claim s at a real
rate that exce eds unit y.
The real savi ngs leve l of a young member of
gene ratio n tis give n by
There are ,r old surv ivor s per young agen
t, so that if claim s to
consumption are paid off at a rate R, nonn
egat ive prof its in the savi ng
indu stry requ ire
(B. 1)

w/R s(b,l )dv* {b)

,r

~ i+ww.

We show that (B.1 ) hold s with equa lity for
some R > 1 by veri fyin g that it
hold s as a stri ct ineq uali ty for R = 1.

l
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First notice that s(b, 1), the optimally chosen savings of a member of
generatio n t -1 with a bequest b satisfy
0
-u'(w+b-s (b,1)) + vu'(s(b,1 )) = O.
Hence, since w < 1,
u'(w+b-s( b,1)) < u'(s(b,1) ),
which implies that

w + b - s(b,1) > s(b,1)
or that

(B.2)
To

s(b,1) < !t!:,£

y

2 '

evaluate

the

LHS of (B.1)

character ization of~

b1

b > O.

• and

R = 1,

we

utilize

our

explicit

(B.2) to get:

= s(b 0 ,1) = s(0,1) < w
2;
w+b

b

with

= s(b 1 ,1) < 2
2

1

< ~2

+ ~

4

In general, then,
(B.3)

s(bk 1 1) <

i

k
Z

j:O

Consequen tly, the LHS of (B.1) with R =
00

fork - 0,1,2, ••••

is less than

w[1-(1/2) k+1 Jw(1-v) k

which completes the proof.
The equilibriu m consumpti on levels for generatio ns t , t +1, t +2,
0
0
0
etc., then follow the stationar y annuity equilibriu m of section 2, and are
given by (3.15).

.
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FOOTNOTES
1.

A similarl y derived diversit y in agents' initial earning capacity is
discusse d by Lowry (1981) in a model where markets for sharing risks
associat ed with random human capital product ivity are included .

2.• · An alternat ive specific ation of the environm ent that would achieve

the same effect involves endowments in the second period of life, in
addition to those at birth.
No assets are needed in this case to
facilita te intergen erationa l trades, but the desire to share death
related risks is still present.

3.

The function h(•,R) exists by property (11) of s(•,R).

4.

With diversit y of survival probabi lities within generati ons, 1jl will
be slightly more involved but will display the same qualitat ive
features . Depending on how decende nts' survival rates evolve through
time, Appendix A can be used with slight modific ations to derive the
appropr iate bequest distribu tion.

5.

For U(c 1,c ) = logc + wlogc it can be shown that V(b) < EUa for all
2
1
2
bin {bk' k=0,1,2, ••• } when ,r < 0.1.

6.

,r-1
Letting T(b) = u (.1- (w+b) + --:-s
(b,1)], we have that T'(b) > 0 while
1+11'
11'+ 1

•

T"(b)
which may be positive if d2s(b,1)/d b 2 is a large negative number. We
could not find general restrict ions on u( •) that would rule out this
nn,cic:d
,,, _____
hi•••VJ
1 i +-u •
However, notice that for all utilitie s of the constan t
relative risk aversion type, T"(b) < 0 since s(b,1) is linear in b.
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